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IDEA-THE THIRD CIRCUIT SETS ITS STANDARDS FOR INTERPRETING THE
MAINSTREAMING REQUIREMENT OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH

DIsABILrTIEs EDUCATION ACT

Oberti v. Board of Education (1993)
I. INTRODUCTION

In an effort to assist states and localities to provide for the education
of all disabled children, Congress enacted the Education of the Handicapped Act of 1975.1 Today, this statute is known as the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 2 In enacting the IDEA, Congress
found that one million of the estimated eight million children with disabilities in the United States are entirely excluded from the public school system and will not be educated with their peers.3 To remedy this problem,
the IDEA provides that states receiving federal funding under the IDEA
must ensure that disabled children 4 are educated in regular classrooms 5
with nondisabled children as much as possible. 6 The requirement of
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The express purpose of
the Act is to assure that:
[A]ll children with disabilities have available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of
children with disabilities and their parents or guardians are protected, to
assist States and localities to provide for the education of all children with
disabilities, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate
children with disabilities.
Id. § 1400(c). For a general discussion of the IDEA, see John H. Kibbler, Comment, The Education of the HandicappedAct: The Floorof Opportunity, 12 J. Juv. L. 26
(1991) and Michael S. Treppa, Comment, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act: Trends and Problems with the "Related Seruices"Provision,18 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REv. 427 (1988).

2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The name of the statute
was changed to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act pursuant to an
amendment effective October 1, 1990. Id. § 1400(a).
3. Id. § 1400(b) (4). Congress also found that "more than half of the children
with disabilities in the United States do not receive appropriate educational services which would enable them to have full equality of opportunity." Id.
§ 1400(b) (3).
4. Id. § 1401(a) (1) (A) (defining "children with disabilities" as children "(i)
with mental retardation, hearing impairments including deafness, speech or language impairments, visual impairments including blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health
impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by reason thereof, need
special education and related services").
5. The phrase "regular classroom" is commonly used in the cases interpreting
the IDEA to mean a classroom of nondisabled children. See, e.g., Oberti v. Board
of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1207 (3d Cir. 1993).
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (B). To qualify for federal assistance under the IDEA,
states must establish "procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropri(1057)
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integrating children with disabilities in regular classrooms is called
"mainstreaming." 7
In Oberti v. Board of Education,8 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit addressed the mainstreaming requirement of IDEA for
the first time. In Section II, this Casebrief reviews the background of the
mainstreaming requirement of the IDEA.9 Section III analyzes the test
adopted by the Third Circuit for interpreting the mainstreaming requirement. 10 In Section IV, this Casebrief discusses the burden of proof and
standard of review under the IDEA. 1 Section V then examines how the
Third Circuit applied its newly-adopted test in Oberti.12 Finally, in Section
VI, this Casebrief concludes with a summary of the Oberti decision and
guidelines for the Third Circuit practitioner involved in a case concerning
13
the IDEA mainstreaming requirement.
II.

FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION AND THE MAINSTREAMING
REQUIREMENT OF THE

IDEA

As a condition to receiving federal funding under the IDEA,
participating states must assure "all children with disabilities the right
to a free appropriate public education." 14 In Board of Education v.
ate, children with disabilities... are educated with children who are not disabled
Id. .
7. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1207. The Third Circuit in Oberti noted that some educa-

tors prefer the term "inclusion" rather than "mainstreaming." Id. at 1207 n.1. Be-

cause it is the more commonly used term, "mainstreaming" will be used in this
Casebrief. See Steve Heise, Comment, Mainstreamingof HandicappedChildren in Education, 8 J. Juv. L. 105, 110 (1984) (observing that "mainstreaming" is term for

integrating disabled children into regular school program with nondisabled children rather than segregating them in special education settings for disabled

children).
8. 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).
9. For a discussion of the mainstreaming requirement of the IDEA, see infa
notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the mainstreaming test adopted by the Third Circuit,
see infa notes 22-62 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the burden of proof and standard of review under

IDEA, see infra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the facts and analysis of Oberti, see infra notes 83-134
and accompanying text.
13. For a summary of the Oberti decision, see infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (Supp. V 1993). The IDEA defines "free appropriate
public education" as:
special education and related services that- (A) have been provided at
public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without
charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the
individualized education program required under section 1414(a) (5) of
this tide.
Id. § 1401 (a) (18); see also Straube v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 778 F. Supp. 774
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that "free appropriate public education" under IDEA re-
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Rowley, 15 the United States Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "free
appropriate public education" to mean special instruction that satisfies the
unique needs of disabled children, and special services that enable dis16
abled children to benefit from the instruction. Subsequently, the Third
Circuit construed Rowey to require states to offer disabled children individualized education programs (IEPs) tailored to meet their specific
needs. 1 7 Among other things, the IEP must include "a statement of the
child's current level of educational performance, annual goals for the
to which
child, specific educational services to be provided, and the extent
18
programs."
educational
regular
in
participate
will
child
the
In addition to the free appropriate public education requirement, the
IDEA provides that in order to qualify for funds, states must establish "procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, children with
quires personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit disabled
children to benefit educationally from that instruction).
15. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
16. Id. at 188-89. The Rowley Court established a two-part test to determine
whether a disabled child is receiving a free appropriate education: "First, has the
State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized educational program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive education benefits?" Id. at 181 n.4.
Rowley, however, did not involve the mainstreaming requirement of the IDEA. The
Rowley two-part test assumes that the IDEA mainstreaming requirement has been
met. For this reason, Rowley is not helpful in deciding. mainstreaming cases like
Oberti. See Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 695-96 (11th Cir. 1991)
(observing that Rowley test was not intended to resolve mainstreaming issues);
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); A.W.
v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 n.7. (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 847 (1987).
17. See Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 18085 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989). In Polk, the court observed
that the individualized educational program (IEP) "consists of a detailed written
statement arrived at by a multi-disciplinary team summarizing the child's abilities,
outlining goals for the child's education and specifying the services the child will
receive." Id. at 173; see a/soJohnson v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit 13,
Lancaster City Sch. Dist., 757 F. Supp. 606 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that under
IDEA, schools must consider individual needs of disabled children and design IEPs
appropriate for those children).
18. See Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1213 n.16 (3d Cir. 1993).

The IDEA defines an "individualized education program" as a written document
containing:
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such

child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional
objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to
participate in regular educational programs .... (E) the projected date

for initiation and anticipated duration of such services, and (F) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are
being achieved.
§ 1401(a)(20). The Third Circuit in Oberti referred to the IEP as the
U.S.C.
20
"centerpiece" of the IDEA. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1213 n.16.
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disabilities... are educated with children who are not disabled .... $,19
This mainstreaming directive of the IDEA further provides that disabled
children should only be removed from the regular classroom if their disabilities are so severe that education in the regular classroom cannot be
achieved satisfactorily. 20 Several courts have recognized that the language
of the IDEA mainstreaming requirement indicates a strong congressional
21
preference for integrating disabled children in regular classrooms.
III.

THIRD CIRCUIT STANDARDS FOR INTERPRETING THE
MAINSTREAMING DIREcTIVE:

IDEA

THE Two-PART TEST

In Oberti v. Board of Education,22 the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey adopted a test for interpreting the IDEA mainstreaming requirement that was first set forth by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Roncker v. Walter.2 3 In Roncker, the court
stated: "In a case where the segregated facility is considered superior, the
court should determine whether the services which make that placement
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1988). The federal regulations promulgated
under IDEA echo this mainstreaming requirement, stating that children with disabilities must be educated in the "least restrictive environment." 34 C.F.R.
§§ 300.550-300.556 (1993).
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (B). Factors relevant in determining whether a placement is appropriate under the IDEA include: (1) the educational benefits available to the child in a regular classroom, supplemented with appropriate aids and
services, as compared to the educational benefits of a special education classroom;
(2) the nonacademic benefits to the child from interaction with nondisabled children; (3) the effect of the disabled child's presence on the teacher and other children in the regular classroom; and (4) the cost of supplementary aids and services
necessary to mainstream the disabled child in a regular classroom. Board of Educ.,
Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 878 (E.D. Cal.
1992), aff'd, 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2679 (1994); see also St.
Louis Dev. Disabilities Treatment Ctr. Parents Ass'n v. Mallory, 591 F. Supp. 1416
(D. Mo. 1984) (noting that it is possible to provide free appropriate education
within meaning of the IDEA in segregated classroom; mainstreaming is not proper
for every disabled child), aff'd, 767 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1985); Thornock v. Boise
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 767 P.2d 1241, 1251 (Idaho) (holding that school district
may validly find mainstreaming disabled child inappropriate where educational
experience would not be productive, or where it woulddisrupt classroom), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1068 (1988).
21. See Devries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 878 (4th Cir. 1989)
(observing that the IDEA denotes strong congressional preference in favor of
mainstreaming disabled children into regular classrooms); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd.
of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036,1044 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); Lachman v. Illinois State Bd.
of Educ., 852 F.2d 290, 295 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988);
A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 162 (8th Cir. 1987) (same);
Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864
(1983); Cordero by Bates v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., 795 F. Supp. 1352, 1359
(M.D. Pa. 1992) (same); Board of Educ., Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 878 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (same).
22. 801 F. Supp. 1392 (D.NJ. 1992).
23. Id. at 1401 (citing Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983)).
Roncker was the first federal court of appeals case to interpret the IDEA mainstreaming requirement.
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superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they
can, the placement in the segregated school would be inappropriate
under the Act." 24 The district court in Oberti, applying the Roncker test,
found that the school district had violated the IDEA. 25 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's deci26
sion, but adopted a different, more stringent test.
The Third Circuit, in Oberti, applied a two-part test to determine
whether the school was complying with the IDEA mainstreaming requirement. 27 This test was modeled after the Fifth Circuit case of DanielR.R v.
State Board of Education.28 Under the first prong of the test, a court must
determine whether a regular classroom supplemented with special-aids
29
and services can provide a satisfactory education for the disabled child.
If the court finds that placement outside the regular classroom is warranted, then the court must still apply the second prong of the test and
decide whether the school has attempted to mainstream the disabled child
in school programs whenever possible.30 This second prong is absent
from the Roncher test.
The Third Circuit adopted the Daniel P.R.two-part test because the
court determined that the test was faithful to the IDEA's directive to integrate disabled children with nondisabled children "to the maximum extent appropriate."3 1 In rejecting the Roncker test, the Third Circuit, in
Oberti, reasoned that the Roncher test was inadequate because it failed to
24. Ronker, 700 F.2d at 1063; see Northwest R-1, 813 F.2d at 163 (adopting Sixth
Circuit Roncker test).
25. 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1402 (D.N.J. 1992).
26. Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993). The Third
Circuit adopted the two-part Daniel R.R test because it felt that test closely tracked
the language of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (B), the IDEA mainstreaming requirement. Id.
27. Id.

28. 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950
F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1991) (adopting Fifth Circuit two-part test and holding that
school district did not comply with IDEA mainstreaming requirement because it
failed to take steps during development of IEP to accommodate ten-year-old girl
with Down's syndrome).
29. See Daniel RR, 874 F.2d at 1048. The Third Circuit in Oberti noted that
"[e]ducation in the regular classroom, in this context, means placement in a regular class for a significant portion of the school day." Oberti 995 F.2d at 1215 n.21.
Thus the court allowed for some leeway in determining what constitutes "education in the regular classroom." Id. Presumably, a portion of the disabled child's
school day may be spent receiving special education outside the regular classroom
without failing the first prong of the test. The court in Oberti did not precisely
define "significant portion of the school day."
30. Oberti. 995 F.2d at 1215 (quoting Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874
F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989)).
31. Id. The Third Circuit specifically stated: "We think this two-part test,
which closely tracks the language of [the IDEA) is faithful to IDEA's directive that
children with disabilities be educated with nondisabled children 'to the maximum
extent appropriate,' and to the Act's requirement that schools provide individualId. (citations
ized programs to account for each child's specific needs .....
omitted).
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include the second prong inquiry in its analysis.3 2 That is, even if a disabled child cannot be satisfactorily educated in a regular classroom, the
school must still attempt to include the disabled child in regular school
programs. For example, the court noted that disabled children could be
included in regular school activities such as music, art, lunch and recess,
even if integration for the major portion of the school day could not be
33
achieved satisfactorily.
A.

The First Prong of the Mainstreaming Test

In Oberti, the Third Circuit discussed several factors a court should
consider in applying the first prong of the DanielR.R. test (i.e. whether the
disabled child can be educated satisfactorily in a regular classroom with
supplementary aids and services). 3 4 These factors include: (1) the steps
the school district has made to accommodate the child in a regular classroom; (2) the educational benefits available to the child in a regular class
(with appropriate supplementary aids and services) as compared to the
benefits provided in a special education class; and (3) the possible negative effects of mainstreaming the child on the education of the other students in the class.3 5 Other factors, such as cost, may be relevant in
36
determining compliance with the IDEA mainstreaming requirement.
32. Id. In adopting the two-part test, the Third Circuit noted that the benefits
of mainstreaming were not limited to the academic classroom setting. Id. at 1216.
As the court noted, children with disabilities can benefit from inclusion in such
nonacademic classes as music, lunch, recess and assemblies. Id. Because the twopart test is concerned with the entire school day (notjust academic class time), the
Third Circuit found it preferable to the Roncker test. Id.
33. Id.; see also Liscio by Hippensteel v. Woodland Hills Sch. Dist., 734 F.
Supp. 689 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that school district was required to explore
feasibility of mainstreaming mentally disabled child into classes for nonacademic
subjects, even though child would have to take academic subjects in segregated
special education classes), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1561 (3d Cir. 1990); Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47 (D. Ala. 1981) (holding that IEP
provided for severely retarded eighteen-year-old boy did not place him in contact
with nondisabled students to maximum extent appropriate where he had virtually
no contact with nondisabled students outside of is lunch period).
34. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216-18. The Third Circuit in Oberti noted that additional factors may be relevant in applying the first prong of the DanielR. test; the
list of factors discussed by the court is not exhaustive. Id. at 1218 n.25.
35. Id. at 1217-18; see also Board of Educ., Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist.
v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (outlining relevant factors in determining whether placement of disabled child is appropriate under IDEA).
36. Oberti 995 F.2d at 1218 n.25; see Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d
688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that "[i]f the cost of educating a handicapped
child in a regular classroom is so great that it would significantly impact upon the
education of other children in the district, then education in a regular classroom is
not appropriate"); Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 154 (4th Cir.)
(holding that Congress intended states to balance competing interests of economic necessity and special needs of disabled children when making placement
decisions), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 175 (1991); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058,
1063 (6th Cir. 1983) (observing that "cost is a proper factor to consider since excessive spending on one handicapped child deprives other handicapped chil-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss4/10

6

Lyons: IDEA - The Third Circuit Sets Its Standards for Interpreting the

1994]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

1063

According to the Third Circuit, the first factor that should be considered in applying the first prong of the Daniel RR test is the extent to
which the school made efforts to include the disabled child in a regular
classroom.3 7 Under the IDEA, schools are required to provide supplementary aids and services to enable children with disabilities to learn in a
regular classroom whenever possible.38 Such supplementary services include resource rooms,3 9 itinerant instruction, speech therapy and behavior modification programs. 40 In addition to providing supplementary
services, schools must also attempt to modify the regular education program to accommodate the unique needs of the disabled child. 4 1 If a
school fails to include a disabled child in a regular classroom with supplementary services, and fails to modify the regular curriculum to accommodate the child, then it has most likely violated the mainstreaming
42
requirement of the IDEA.
The second factor discussed by the Third Circuit in determining
whether a disabled child can be integrated into a regular classroom is the
comparison between the benefits the child would receive in a regular classroom (with supplementary aids and services) and the benefits the child
would receive in a segregated classroom. 43 The Third Circuit noted that
dren"). The court in Oberti did not consider the cost factor because the parties did
not raise the issue.
37. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216; see also Greer, 950 F.2d at 696 (noting that the
"[court] must examine whether the school district has taken steps to accommodate
the handicapped child in the regular classroom"); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of
Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989) (same).
38. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.551 (a) (1993) ("Each public agency shall ensure that a
continuum of alternative placements is available to meet the needs of children
with disabilities for special education and related services."). The regulations further state that the continuum of placement must provide "supplementary services
(such as resource room [s] or itinerant instruction) ... in conjunction with regular

class placement." Id. § 300.551(b) (2).
39. "Resource rooms" have been defined as special "instructional centers offering individual and small group instruction in place of regular classroom instruction" to disabled students. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 28-4.3(c),(d) (1994).
40. See Greer, 950 F.2d at 696 (holding that under IDEA school district must
consider entire range of supplementary aids and services, including resource
rooms and itinerant instruction); DanielRK, 874 F.2d at 1048 (noting that while
schools need not provide every conceivable supplementary aid or service to assist
disabled children, IDEA does not permit school districts to make token gestures to
accommodate disabled students).
41. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216; see also 34 C.F.R. Part 300, App. C, Question 48
(1993) (stating that "[i]f modifications.., to the regular program are necessary to
ensure the child's participation in that program, those modifications must be described in the child's IEP .... This applies to any regular education program in
which the student may participate, including physical education, art, music, and
vocational education.").
42. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216; see also Daniel R, 874 F.2d at 1048 (noting that
even if states provide supplementary aids and services and modify regular education program courts must examine whether those efforts are sufficient).
43. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216; see also Greer, 950 F.2d at 697 (noting that in comparing benefits of regular classrooms with those of special education classrooms,
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in comparing regular and segregated classrooms, courts must consider the
benefits of integration that are not available in a segregated setting.44 Several courts have recognized that mainstreaming children with disabilities
into regular classrooms may be beneficial in and of itself.45 For example,
in Daniel R., the Fifth Circuit observed that "a child may be able to absorb only a minimal amount of the regular education program, but may
benefit enormously from the language models that his [or her] nonhandicapped peers provide."4 6 The Third Circuit in Oberti also noted that disabled children can develop valuable social and communication skills from
47
interaction with nondisabled children.
According to the Third Circuit, a determination that a disabled child
may make greater academic progress in a segregated, special education
class may not warrant excluding that child from a regular classroom. 48 In
other words, academic progress is not the sole consideration; other benefits such as social development and communication skills must be taken
into account. 49 The Third Circuit in Oberti emphasized that children with

school districts should be aware that academic achievement is not only benefit of
mainstreaming); Daniel RR, 874 F.2d at 1049 (observing that court's inquiry extends beyond examination of educational benefits alone).
44. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216. The Third Circuit in Oberti noted that in addition
to academic learning, "[I]earning to associate, communicate and cooperate with
nondisabled persons is essential to the personal independence of children with
disabilities." Id. at n.23; see also Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16,
853 F.2d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (observing that in passing IDEA, Congress recognized importance of teaching skills that will enable children with disabilities to
attain personal independence), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989).
45. See, e.g., Greer, 950 F.2d at 697 (noting that integrating disabled students
into nondisabled environment may be beneficial even if disabled students do not
flourish academically); Board of Educ., Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 882 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (observing that placing mentally retarded child in regular classroom setting led to development of social and
communicative skills and improved self-esteem).
46. Daniel RR, 874 F.2d at 1049; see Greer, 950 F.2d at 697 ("[A] determination by the school district that a handicapped child will make academic progress
[faster] in a self-contained special education environment may not justify educating the child in that environment if the child would receive considerable nonacademic benefit, such as language and role modeling, from association with...
nonhandicapped peers.").
47. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216. According to the Third Circuit, "a fundamental
value of the right to public education for children with disabilities is the right to
associate with nondisabled peers." Id. at 1216-17. The court also recognized that
mainstreaming disabled children into regular classrooms can have reciprocal benefits to the nondisabled students in the class. Id. at 1217 n.24. Specifically, the
court observed that teaching nondisabled students to work and cooperate with
disabled students "may do much to eliminate the stigma, mistrust and hostility that
have traditionally been harbored against persons with disabilities." Id.
48. Id. at 1217.
49. See id. at 1217; Greer, 950 F.2d at 697; Daniel RR, 874 F.2d at 1049.
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disabilities may learn differently in regular classrooms, but this fact alone
"does not justify exclusion from that environment." 50
The third factor discussed by the Oberticourt in determining whether
a disabled child can be educated satisfactorily in a regular classroom is the
potential negative effect that mainstreaming may have on the education of
the other children in the regular classroom.5 1 A child with disabilities may
be so disruptive in a regular classroom that the education of other students is significantly impaired.5 2 Moreover, if a child is being very disruptive, it is likely that he or she is not benefitting educationally from the
regular classroom.5 3 The Third Circuit also noted that courts should consider whether the disabled child's disruptive behavior demands so much
of the teacher's attention that the teacher will be required to ignore the
other students in order to tend to the disabled child.M
In determining the possible negative effect of a disabled student's disruptive behavior, courts must be mindful of the school's obligation to provide supplementary services to accommodate the child's particular
disability.55 The Third Circuit in Oberti emphasized that a well-conceived
IEP (consisting of supplementary aids and services) may reduce the likelihood of disruptive behavior.5 6 For example, a teaching assistant or aide
50. Obert4 995 F.2d at 1217; see DanielRR, 874 F.2d at 1047. The Fifth Circuit
in Daniel RR observed that the IDEA "accepts the notion that handicapped students will participate in regular education but that some of them will not benefit as
much as nonhandicapped students will." Id. The Daniel RK court therefore held,
inter alia, that if a disabled child's individual needs make mainstreaming appropriate, the child may not be removed from the regular classroom setting "simply because his [or her] educational achievement lags behind that of his [or her]
classmates." Id. Agreeing with the Daniel R. court, the Third Circuit in Oberti
noted that states must address the individual needs of disabled students while recognizing that disabled students may benefit differently from their nondisabled
classmates. Oberti 995 F.2d at 1217.
51. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217; see Gree, 950 F.2d at 697 (observing that school
districts may consider possible negative effects mainstreaming disabled children
may have on education of other children); Daniel RR, 874 F.2d at 1049 (same).
52. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 (1993) ("[W]here a handicapped child is so disruptive in a regular classroom that the education of other students is significantly
impaired, the needs of the handicapped child cannot be met in that environment.
Therefore regular placement would not be appropriate to his or her needs." (quoting 34 C.F.R. Part 104 App., 24)).
53. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217. If a disruptive child is not benefitting educationally in the regular classroom, it is likely that the child is not receiving a "free appropriate education" as required by the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (Supp. V
1993).
54. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217. In Daniel RR, the Fifth Circuit also explained
that if the disabled child "requires so much of the teacher['s] ... time that the rest
of the class suffers, then the balance will tip in favor of placing the child in special
education." 874 F.2d at 1049-50.
55. See Oberti 995 F.2d at 1217; Greer,950 F.2d at 697 (noting that "the school
district must keep in mind its obligation to consider supplemental aids and services
that could accommodate a handicapped child's need for additional attention");
Daniel RR, 874 F.2d at 1049 (same).
56. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217.
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can help tend to a disabled child's needs, thereby reducing the burden on
57
the teacher.
B.

The Second Prong of the MainstreamingTest

In Oberti, the Third Circuit held that even if a court determines that a
disabled child cannot be educated satisfactorily in a regular classroom, the
court must still apply the second prong of the Daniel RR. mainstreaming
test. 58 That is, the court must decide whether the school district has included the disabled child in school programs with nondisabled students to
the maximum extent appropriate. 59 As the Third Circuit explained, IDEA
does "not contemplate an all-or-nothing educational system in which
60
handicapped children attend either regular or special education."
Quoting the Daniel RR court approvingly, the Third Circuit in Oberti
stated that "the school must take intermediate steps wherever appropriate,
such as placing the child in regular education for some academic classes
and in special education for others, mainstreaming the child for nonacademic classes only, or providing interaction with nonhandicapped children during lunch and recess." 6 1 The Third Circuit concluded its
will
discussion of the DanielR.R test by noting that mainstreaming options
62
vary from child to child, and may change as the child matures.

57. Daniel RR, 874 F.2d at 1049. To satisfy the mainstreaming requirement

of the IDEA, schools must "hire various specially trained personnel to help handicapped children." Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 893 (1984).
Schools must also assign a teacher's aide to the regular classroom, if necessary, to
accommodate the unique needs of disabled students. See, e.g., Department of

Educ., State of Hawaii v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 813 (9th Cir. 1983) (ordering
teacher's aide to assist child with cystic fibrosis), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985).

58. Oberti 995 F.2d at 1218; see DanielRR, 874 F.2d at 1050 ("If [the court]
determine [s] that education in the regular classroom cannot be achieved satisfactorily, [the court] next ask[s] whether the child has been mainstreamed to the
maximum extent appropriate"); Lachman v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d
290, 296 n.7 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that IDEA requires school districts to offer

disabled children continuum of services (citing Wilson v. Marana Sch. Dist. No. 6
of Prima County, 735 F.2d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 1984))).
59. Daniel R.R, 874 F.2d at 1050 (observing that school district fulfills mainstreaming obligation under IDEA only if district provides disabled students maximum appropriate exposure to nondisabled students).
60. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1218 (quoting Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874
F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1989)); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.551(a) (1993) (stating

that "[e ] ach public agency shall ensure that a continuum of alternative placements
is available to meet the needs of children with disabilities").
61. Obert, 995 F.2d at 1218 (quoting Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874

F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1989)). The Fifth Circuit in DanielRR. noted that nonacademic classes include art, music and physical education. 874 F.2d at 1050 n.10.
62. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1218 (citing Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d
1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1989)).
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IV.

BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW OF THE
MAINSTREAMING REQUIREMENT UNDER THE

A.

IDEA

The Burden of Proof

In Oberti, the Third Circuit held that the school district bears the burden of proving compliance with the IDEA mainstreaming requirement.6 3
The school district contended that, while it may have had the initial burden (at the state administrative level) of justifying its educational placement, once the agency decided in its favor, the burden should have shifted
to the parents when they challenged the agency decision in the district
court. 64 In making this argument, the school district relied on the United
States Supreme Court's ruling in Rowley that "due weight shall be given to
[the state administrative] proceedings." 65 The Third Circuit disagreed
with the school district and ruled that the burden of proving compliance
with the IDEA mainstreaming requirement was properly placed on the
school. 66
According to the Oberti court, the "due weight" language of Rowley
does not dictate that the burden of proof be placed on the party who
challenges the agency decision. 67 Under the IDEA, district courts and
state trial courts, review the decisions of state educational agencies must
"receive the records of the administrative proceedings... hear additional
evidence at the request of a party, and, basing [their] decision[s] on the
preponderance of the evidence ....

grant such relief as the court deter-

mines is appropriate."68 Rowey interpreted this section of the IDEA to
mean that courts should give "due weight" to the administrative proceedings. 69 However, as the Third Circuit pointed out, neither Rowley nor the
IDEA itself specifically addresses which party bears the burden of proof at
the district court level. 70 Therefore, the Third Circuit refused to rule that
63. Id. at 1219-20.
64. Id. To support the argument that the district court improperly placed the
burden of proof on the school district, the school district cited several cases. See

Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983,991 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that
"the burden rests with the complaining party to prove that the agency's decision
was wrong"), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 912 (1991); Briggs v. Board of Educ., 882 F.2d
688, 692 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (same). The Third Circuit in Oberti found these cases to be unpersuasive.

Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219.
65. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982) (construing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(e) (1988)).

66. Obert, 995 F.2d at 1219-20.
67. Id. at 1219. The Third Circuit stated that the purpose of the Rowley "due
weight" requirement is "to prevent the court from imposing its own view of preferable educational methods on the states." Id.
68. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2) (1988). The Third Circuit in Oberti construed this
section of the IDEA to mean that due weight should be afforded to the administrative proceedings but "not to the party who happened to prevail in those proceedings." Obert4 995 F.2d at 1219.
69. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
70. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1218.
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giving due weight to the administrative proceedings is equivalent to placing the burden of proof on the challenging party. 7 1
In placing the burden of proof on the school district, the Third Circuit noted that under the IDEA, the district court "must make an independent determination based on a preponderance of the evidence." 72
From this premise, the Oberti court maintained that if "the district court
must independently review the evidence adduced at the administrative
proceedings and can receive new evidence, [there is] no reason to shift
the ultimate burden of proof to the party who happened to have lost
before the state agency."7 3 According to the Third Circuit, the "due
weight" mandate of Rowey is simply designed to ensure that courts do not
substitute their own views of appropriate educational methods for those of
the states.74 Moreover, the Third Circuit noted that the amount of "due
weight" to be afforded the administrative proceedings is a matter within
the discretion of the district court. 75
To support its position that the burden of proof should be placed on
the school district, the Third Circuit in Oberti used a policy argument
based on the legislative purpose of the IDEA.76 According to the Third
Circuit, "[r]equiring parents to prove at the district court level that the
school has failed to comply with the Act would undermine the Act's express purpose 'to assure that the rights of children with disabilities and
71. Id. The Third Circuit explicitly stated that the burden of proof at the
district court level is "an issue.., quite different from the district court's obligation to afford due weight to the administrative proceedings." Id.
72. Id. at 1219 (quoting Geis v. Board of Educ., 774 F.2d 575, 583 (3d Cir.
1985)).
73. Id.
74. Id.; Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982) (stating that purpose of giving due weight to administrative proceedings is to prevent courts from

substituting their views of appropriate educational methods for those of states); see

also Rapid City Sch. Dist. 51-4 v. Vahle, 733 F. Supp. 1364, 1368 (W.D.S.D.) (holding that reviewing court must make independent determination of appropriate-

ness of placement based on preponderance of evidence, but is cautioned not to
substitute its own notions of educational policy for those of school authorities),
aff'd, 922 F.2d 476 (8th Cir. 1990).
75. Obert4 995 F.2d at 1219; seeJefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 853
F.2d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting that "the district court must consider the
administrative findings of fact, but is free to accept or reject them").
76. Obert, 995 F.2d at 1219. The express purpose of the IDEA is:
to assure that all children with disabilities have available to them . . . a
free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education
and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that
the rights of children with disabilities and their parents or guardians are
protected, to assist States and localities to provide for the education of all
children with disabilities, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate children with disabilities.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. IV 1992). The Third Circuit in Oberti stated that "[i]n
light of the statutory purpose of [the] IDEA[,] ... when [the] IDEA mainstreaming requirement is specifically at issue, it is appropriate to place the burden of
proving compliance with [the] IDEA on the school." Obert, 995 F.2d at 1219.
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their parents are protected.' 77 The court also explained that placing the
burden of proof on the school district is appropriate because the school
district has certain tactical advantages in an IDEA mainstreaming dispute. 78 For example, the school district has "better access to the relevant
information, greater control over the potentially more persuasive wit79
nesses ...and greater overall educational expertise than the parents."
For these reasons, the Third Circuit in Obertiheld that the burden should
be placed on the school district to prove compliance with the mainstream°
ing requirement of the IDEA.8
B.

The Standard of Review

In Oberti, the Third Circuit held that the district court's findings of
fact should be reviewed under the deferential "clearly erroneous" standard.8 1 Findings of fact are considered "clearly erroneous" if, after reviewing the evidence, the appellate court is "left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed."8 2 In reviewing the findings of fact in an IDEA case like Oberti, the Third Circuit will also consider
whether the district court has afforded "due weight" to the administrative
83
agency proceedings.

77. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. IV 1992)).
In making this policy argument based on the statutory purpose of the IDEA, the
Third Circuit stated that the IDEA's strong preference for mainstreaming "would
be turned on its head if parents had to prove that their child was worthy of being
included, rather than the school district having tojustify a decision to exclude the
child from the regular classroom." Id.

78. Id.; seeLascari v. Board of Educ., 560 A.2d 1180, 1188 (N.J. 1989) (placing
burden of proof on school district is "consistent with the proposition that the burdens of persuasion and of production should be placed on the party better able to
meet those burdens").
79. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219; see also David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children
with Disabilities: Educational Rights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DuKE L.J.
166, 187-94 (observing that parents are disadvantaged in mainstreaming dispute
with school district because parents lack educational expertise and their views are
often seen as biased).
80. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219-20.
81. Id. at 1220.
82. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). The Third Circuit in
Oberti further enunciated this level of review by stating that "even if we might have

come to different factual conclusions based on this record, we defer to the findings
of the district court unless we are convinced that the record cannot support those
findings." 995 F.2d at 1220.
83. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1220. Fora discussion of the Rowley "due weight" man-

date, see supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
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FACIS AND ANALYSIS OF OBERTI

A. Factual and ProceduralBackground
Rafael Oberti, an eight-year-old boy with Down's syndrome,84 was
evaluated by the Clementon School District (school district) prior to his
entry into kindergarten.8 5 Based on its evaluation, the school district recommended that Rafael be educated in a special segregated class for the
1989-90 school year.8 6 Rafael was subsequently placed in a developmental
kindergarten class (for children not yet ready for kindergarten) at the Clementon Elementary School in the mornings, and a special education class
87
in another school district for the afternoon session.
While Rafael did make some academic and social progress during the
year, he also exhibited certain inappropriate behavior in the developmental kindergarten class.88 Rafael's behavioral problems included throwing
tantrums, hitting other children and hiding under tables.8 9 Rafael also
90
had toilet training accidents in the developmental kindergarten class.
The school district attempted to contain Rafael's behavior, but its efforts
did little to resolve Rafael's problems.9 1 Although Rafael had problems in
the developmental kindergarten class, he did not exhibit similar disruptive
92
behavior in the afternoon special education class.
84. Down's syndrome is "a chromosome disorder characterized by... moderate to severe mental retardation . . . ." THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICALLEGAL DiCTnONARY 1992 Supplement. This genetic defect "severely impairs [Rafael's] intellectual functioning and his ability to communicate." Oberti, 995 F.2d at
1207. Rafael therefore is a disabled child within the meaning of the IDEA. 20
U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
85. OberAt, 995 F.2d at 1207. The evaluation of Rafael was conducted by the
school district's Child Study Team. Id. This group "was responsible for evaluating
Rafael to determine his eligibility for special education and related services under
the IDEA, and continues to be responsible for developing, monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of his individualized education program." Id. at n.2. The
IDEA provides that "all children residing in the State who are disabled, regardless
of the severity of their disability, and who are in need of special education and
related services [must be] identified, located, and evaluated." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1992).
86. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1207.
87. Id. at 1207-08. Before agreeing to this placement, Rafael's parents visited
several special education classes recommended by the school district and found
them all unacceptable. Id. at 1207.
88. Id. at 1208.
89. Id.
90. Id.

91. Id. The school district's efforts to contain Rafael's behavioral problems
included attempting to modify the curriculum for Rafael, and hiring a teacher's
aide (albeit four months after one was requested by the Obertis). Id. Aside from
these minimal efforts, the school district's IEP for Rafael provided no plan for
addressing Rafael's behavioral problems, and provided for no communication between Rafael's kindergarten teacher and his special education teacher. Id.
92. Id.
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Based largely on Rafael's experience in the developmental kindergarten class, the school district proposed to place Rafael in an out-of-district,
segregated, special education class for the 1990-91 school year. 98 Rafael's
parents objected to this plan and requested that Rafael be placed in a
regular kindergarten class in his home district of Clementon. 94 When this
request was denied by the school district, the Obertis filed for a state dueprocess hearing.95 As an alternative to the due-process hearing, the par96
ties agreed to mediate the dispute.
As a result of mediation, the Obertis and the school district agreed
that, for the 1990-91 school year, Rafael would enter a special education
class in a public elementary school in the Winslow Township School District (Winslow).97 As part of the agreement, the school district promised
to consider mainstreaming possibilities at Winslow and to consider future
inclusive placement for Rafael in the Clementon Elementary School. 9 8
Although Rafael made some behavioral and academic progress at
Winslow, the school did not make any meaningful efforts to mainstream
93. Id. At the end of the 1989-90 school year the school district's Child Study
Team recommended that Rafael be placed in a self-contained special education
class. Id. Because no such class was available in the Clementon School District,
Rafael would have to travel to a different school district. Id.
94. Id. The IDEA contemplates active parental involvement in the educational placement decision. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(20) (Supp. IV 1992) (mandating parental participation in forming IEP); Id. § 1412(7) (stating that consultation with
parents must be assured); see also Board of Educ. v. Dienelt, 843 F.2d 813, 815 (4th
Cir. 1988) (holding that school officials who failed to involve disabled child's parents in preparing IEP did not provide child with "free appropriate public education" as required by IDEA).
95. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1208. In an IDEA dispute between the parents of a
disabled child and the school district, the parents have the right to resolve the
disagreement through a state administrative proceeding called an "impartial due
process hearing." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2) (1988). The IDEA specifically provides
that "[w]henever a complaint has been received under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the parents or guardian shall have an opportunity for an impartial due
process hearing which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by
the local educational agency." Id.
96. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1208. The Obertis and the school district agreed to
mediate the dispute pursuant to New Jersey regulations. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6,
§ 28-2.6 (1994).
97. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1208. The Winslow school was approximately forty-five
minutes by bus from Rafael's home. Id. The federal regulations promulgated
under the IDEA require that each disabled child be placed "as close as possible to
the child's home" and preferably "inthe school which he or she would attend if
nondisabled." 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 (a) (3) & (c) (1993); see also Barnett v. Fairfax
County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 153 (4th Cir.) (holding that federal regulations do
not impose absolute obligation to place disabled children in home district, but
regulatons do require schools to consider geographical proximity of placement),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 859 (1991).

98. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1208. In discussing the agreement between theparties,
the Third Circuit noted that "[a]lthough Rafael was placed in a school within the
Winslow Township School District, the Clementon School District has remained
responsible for Rafael's education under the IDEA because Rafael resides within
the Clementon School District." Id. at n.4.
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Rafael. 9 9 As a result of their disappointment with the Winslow program,
the Obertis brought another due process complaint in January 1991.100 A
hearing was held in February 1991 before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) of the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law. 1° 1 On March 15,
1991, the ALJ affirmed the school district's decision to place Rafael in the
10 2
segregated special education class at Winslow.
The Obertis, contending that Rafael should be mainstreamed into a
regular class in Clementon, brought an action under the IDEA in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.' 0 3 The district
court held a bench trial in May 1992, receiving new evidence from both
the Obertis and the school district.10 4 To supplement the state agency
record, both parties offered additional testimony.' 0 5 Not surprisingly, the
additional evidence regarding the appropriateness of mainstreaming Raf10 6
ael was contradictory.
99. Id. at 1209. At Winslow, Rafael ate lunch and attended assemblies with
nondisabled children, but otherwise had "no opportunity to socialize with the
other children." Id. at n.5. Moreover, Rafael did not participate in any classes with
nondisabled children. Id.
100. Id. at 1209. In bringing their second due process complaint, the Obertis
renewed their request for Rafael to be placed in a regular class in his home district
of Clementon. Id.
101. Id. Under the New Jersey regulations, an IDEA due process hearing is
held before an Administrative Law Judge. NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 282.7(d) (4) (iv) (1994).
102. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1209. In concluding that Rafael was not ready for
mainstreaming, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) relied on the testimony of
Rafael's kindergarten teacher and other witnesses for the school district who testified to Rafael's behavioral problems in the developmental kindergarten class. Id.
The ALJ found that because Rafael's behavior problems were so severe in that
class, Rafael could not benefit from integration in a regular classroom. Id.
In concluding that the Winslow placement did not violate the IDEA, the ALJ
discounted the testimony of the Obertis' expert witnesses. Id. at 1210. These witnesses testified that Rafael could be educated satisfactorily in a regular classroom
with supplementary aids and services. Id. However, because the Obertis' witnesses
did not have daily contact with Rafael, the ALJ effectively disregarded their testimony. Id.
103. Id. at 1210. In addition to the IDEA claim, the Obertis brought an unlawful discrimination claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794. Id. The district court denied cross summary judgment motions,
finding "genuine questions of material fact ... about the feasibility of including
Rafael in a regular classroom setting now." Oberti v. Board of Educ., 789 F. Supp.
1322, 1336 (D.NJ. 1992).
104. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1210. The IDEA provides that "[i]n any action
brought under this paragraph the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as

the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1988).

105. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1210. At trial, both the Obertis and the school district
introduced testimony of additional expert witnesses who had not testified at the
administrative proceeding. Id. at 1210-12.
106. Id. at 1210-11. The Obertis offered the testimony of Dr. Lou Brown, a
professor of special education at the University of Wisconsin; Amy Goldman, an
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After reviewing the new evidence along with the evidence from the
administrative hearing, the district court determined that the school district had failed to prove that its proposed placement of Rafael was consistent with the mainstreaming requirement of the IDEA.10 7 The court
refused to defer to the decision of the ALJ because it found that the ALJ's
findings were based on Rafael's behavioral problems in the developmental
kindergarten class without properly considering the inadequate level of
supplementary aids and services provided by the school district.' 08 The
school district subsequently appealed the ruling of the district court to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 10 9
B.

Third CircuitAnalysis

In reviewing the decision of the district court, the Third Circuit in
Oberti adopted and applied the two-part Daniel RB. test. 110 The first
prong of the test is whether the disabled child can be educated satisfactorily in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and services. 1" The
second prong of the test is whether the disabled child has been included
1 12
in school programs with nondisabled peers whenever possible.
In applying the first prong of the Daniel RR test, the Third Circuit
considered three factors: (1) the steps the school district made to accommodate Rafael in a regular classroom; (2) a comparison of the educational
expert in communication with disabled children; and Dr. Gail McGregor, a professor of education at Temple University and an expert in the education of disabled
children. Id. Based on their evaluations of Rafael, these witnesses testified that
Rafael could be satisfactorily educated in a regular classroom with supplementary
aids and curriculum modifications designed to accommodate Rafael's disability.
Id. at 1211. Addressing Rafael's previous disruptive behavior, Dr. Brown testified
that if adequate supplementary aids and services were provided, Rafael would not
likely exhibit such behavior. Id.
To counter the Obertis' witnesses, the school district offered its own expert,
Dr. Stanley Urban, a professor of special education at Glassboro State College. Id.
at 1212. After observing Rafael and reviewing Rafael's educational history, Dr. Urban concluded that Rafael could not be satisfactorily educated in a regular classroom, and that the Winslow placement was appropriate for Rafael. Id. In addition
to Dr. Urban's testimony, the school district also offered the testimony of several of
Rafael's teachers. Id. These teachers testified that Rafael exhibited inappropriate
behavior, including hitting other children and running away from the teachers,
during the summer and fall of 1991. Id.
107. Oberti v. Board of Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1404 (D.N.J. 1992).
108. Id. The district court concluded that the school district failed to take
reasonable steps to mainstream Rafael in a regular classroom as required by the
IDEA. Id. at 1403. Specifically, the court held that the school did not provide
Rafael with appropriate aids and services, such as specially trained itinerant instructors, behavior modification programs and curriculum modification to accommodate Rafael's special needs. Id.
109. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1212.
110. Id. at 1220. For a discussion of the Daniel R. two-part mainstreaming
test, see supra notes 22-62 and accompanying text.
111. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989).
112. Id.
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benefits available in a regular classroom and the benefits provided in the
special education class at Winslow; and (3) the possible negative effects of
13
Rafael's inclusion on the other children in the class.'
The Third Circuit began its application of the first factor of the test by
considering whether the school district made reasonable efforts to include
Rafael in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and services.' 1 4 On
this issue, the district court found that the school failed to consider less
restrictive placements for Rafael's 1989-90 school year. 115 Specifically, the
district court found that the school district violated the IDEA by not providing adequate supplementary aids and services during Rafael's year in
the developmental kindergarten class. 116 The Third Circuit found little
evidence in the record to contradict the conclusions of the district
court. 1 17 Accordingly, the district court's finding that the school district
made only negligible efforts to mainstream Rafael was not "clearly
118
erroneous."
Next, the Third Circuit examined the second factor of the test-a
comparison of the educational beriefits of the segregated Winslow class
with the benefits Rafael could obtain in a regular class.' 1 9 Before the district court, the parties called expert witnesses who disagreed on the relative benefits of a special, segregated class versus a regular, integrated
class. 120 The Third Circuit explained that the district court was in a better
position to evaluate the conflicting testimony of the parties. 1 1 Consequently, the Third Circuit deferred to the district court's finding that Rafael would benefit academically and socially from integration in a regular
122
classroom setting.
113. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1220. For a discussion of the factors considered in
applying the first prong of the Daniel KR mainstreaming test, see supra notes 3457 and accompanying text.
114. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1220.
115. Oberti, 801 F. Supp. at 1402.
116. Id. The district court in Oberticoncluded that the "School District placed
Rafael in [the developmental kindergarten] class without a curriculum plan, without a behavior management plan, and without providing adequate special education support to the teacher." Id.
117. ObertA 995 F.2d at 1221.
118. Id. The Third Circuit also noted that the district court did not fail to
give due weight to the state administrative proceedings because, in Rafael's case,
the ALJ did not even consider whether the school district took reasonable steps to
mainstream Rafael in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and services.
Id. For a discussion of the Row/ey "due weight" requirement, see supra notes 65-71
and accompanying text.
119. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1221.
120. Id. at 1210-12. For a discussion of the expert testimony offered by both
the Obertis and the school district, see supra note 106.
121. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1222. The Third Circuit again noted that the district
court did not fail to give due weight to the state administrative proceedings because the district court's findings were based on newly received evidence that was
not before the ALJ. Id.
122. Id.
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Concluding its application of the first prong of the Daniel RR. test,
the Third Circuit considered the third factor-the possible disruptive effect of Rafael's inclusion on the other students in the class. 123 The record
again contained conflicting testimony on this issue.12 4 Arguing that Rafael would be too disruptive in a regular class, the school district presented
several witnesses who testified to Rafael's behavior problems in the 198990 developmental kindergarten class. 12 5 Rebutting the school district's evidence, the Obertis' expert witnesses testified that, in their opinion, Rafael
would not exhibit disruptive behavior if provided adequate supplementary
aids and services, and if the curriculum were modified to accommodate
126
his disability.
Presented with this contradictory evidence, the district court was persuaded by the Obertis' witnesses. 12 7 Accordingly, the district court found
that "[t]here is nothing in the record which would suggest that at this
point in time [two years after the 1989-90 school year] Rafael would present similar behavior problems if provided with an adequate level of supplementary aids and related services within the matrix of a regular
education class." 128 Deferring once again, the Third Circuit held that the
findings of the district court were not "clearly erroneous. '12 9 Reasoning
that there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's ruling, the
Third Circuit concluded that the potential negative effects of mainstreaming Rafael did not warrant the school district's decision to exclude him
130
from the regular class.
123. Id.
124. Id. The school district presented several witnesses who testified as to Rafael's disruptive behavior in the developmental kindergarten class and in other settings. Id. at 1212. The Obertis, on the other hand, offered experts who stated that
Rafael's disruptive behavior was the result of a poorly conceived IEP that lacked
the appropriate supplementary aids and services to meet Rafael's unique needs.
Id. at 1211.
125. Id. at 1212. Dr. Urban, the school district's chief expert witness, testified
that "Rafael's behavior problems could not be managed in a regular class, that a
regular teacher would not be able to communicate with a child of Rafael's ability
level, and that it would be difficult if not impossible to ... accommodate Rafael
without adversely affecting the . . .other children in the class." Id.
126. Id. at 1211. Dr. Brown, one of the Obertis' expert witnesses, testified
that Rafael could be effectively mainstreamed into a regular classroom with supplementary aids and services. Id. Dr. Brown also described several curriculum modification techniques that could facilitate Rafael's inclusion. Id. These included
modifying the curriculum to accommodate Rafael's disability and "modifying only
Rafael's program so that he would perform a similar activity or exercise to that
performed by the whole class, but at a level appropriate to his ability." Id.
127. Oberti v. Board of Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1403 (D.N.J. 1992).
128. Id. The district court found that the disruptive behavior Rafael exhibited in the developmental kindergarten class during the 1989-90 school year was
"exacerbated and remained uncontained due to the inadequate level of services
provided there." Id.
129. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1223.
130. Id. The Third Circuit also noted that the district court did not fail to
give due weight to the administrative proceedings on this issue. Id. The court
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After applying the first prong of the DanielRR test, the Third Circuit

held that the school district had violated the mainstreaming requirement
of the IDEA. 131 Affirming the district court's decision, the Third Circuit
concluded that the school district failed to satisfy its burden of proving
that Rafael could not be educated in a regular classroom with supplemen-

tary aids and services. 132 Because the court decided the case based on an
application of the first prong of the Daniel RR test, the court did not
.reach the second prong.' 3 3 The Third Circuit noted, however, that even
if it is determined in the future that Rafael cannot be satisfactorily edu-

cated in a regular classroom, the school district will still be obligated
under the IDEA to mainstream Rafael in regular school programs when-

ever possible.'1

4

VI.

CONCLUSION

In Oberti, the Third Circuit established a clear preference for mainstreaming children with disabilities into regular classrooms. The two-part
test adopted by the court closely tracks the language of the IDEA mainstreaming requirement and creates a presumption against excluding disabled children from the regular classroom setting.' 3 5 In addition to
applying the two-part test, the Third Circuit will place the burden of proof
on the school district in an IDEA mainstreaming dispute.' 3 6 Therefore, to
justify segregating a disabled child, a school district will be required to
show that mainstreaming the child is inappropriate.
Furthermore, the Third Circuit in Oberti applied the deferential
clearly erroneous standard to the district court's findings of fact.' 3 7 Because the court adopted this level of review, mainstreaming cases will often
be won or lost at the trial court level. In Oberti, the Third Circuit demonstrated its deference by accepting all of the district court's findings of
38
fact.'
held that the ALJ's decision not to mainstream Rafael was improperly based on
Rafael's behavioral problems in the developmental kindergarten class where he
received an inadequate level of supplementary aids and services to meet his unique
needs. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. In addition, the court did not address the Obertis' claim under § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
134. Id. at 1223-24.
135. For a discussion of the mainstreaming test adopted by the Third Circuit,
see supra notes 22-62 and accompanying text.
136. For a discussion of the allocation of the burden of proof in an IDEA
mainstreaming case, see supra notes 63-80 and accompanying text.
137. For a discussion of the standard of review applied by the Third Circuit,
see supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
138. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1221-23.
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The testimony of educational experts is crucial in mainstreaming
cases. Oberti was no exception.1 3 9 At trial, the district court was presented
with several expert witnesses. Both parties offered their own experts to
bolster their arguments, and often the testimony conflicted. Given the
Third Circuit's deference to the district court and its decision to place the
burden of proof on the school, such conflicting testimony may be devastating to a school district. If the district court is confronted with conflicting,
equally credible evidence, the court must resolve the issue in favor of the
parents. Then, if the case is appealed by the school district, the Third
Circuit will apply the deferential clearly erroneous standard to the district
court's findings. This scenario was played out in Oberti, and it proved to be
an insurmountable obstacle for the school district.
Finally, it is important to note that no two IDEA mainstreaming cases
are exactly alike. In Oberti, the school district contended that the facts
were analogous to those of Daniel RR, where the Fifth Circuit had held
that placing a six-year-old boy with Down's syndrome in a segregated special education class was appropriate under the IDEA.1 40 However, as the
Third Circuit explained, the mere fact that both Daniel R.R and Rafael
have Down's syndrome does not equate the two cases. 14 ' The mainstreaming directive of the IDEA requires "an individualized, fact-specific inquiry"
into the particular needs and abilities of each child. 142 This individualized
inquiry is essential to the IDEA goal of increasing the "opportunity of individuals with disabilities to become fully-functioning, productive, and co'14 3
equal members of society.
Daniel G. Lyons
139. Id. at 1216. The Third Circuit noted that "[t]he court will have to rely
heavily... on the testimony of educational experts." Id.

140. Id. at 1223 n.28 (discussing Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d
1036, 1050-51 (5th Cir. 1989)). The Third Circuit in Oberti distinguished Daniel
R. by noting that in Daniel RR, the district court granted summary judgment
based on the administrative proceedings, whereas in Obert, the district court held a
bench trial and received new evidence. Id.
141. Id.
142. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd.of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989).
143. Oberti v. Board of Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1407 (D.N.J. 1992).
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